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Hman eneics
Studies- The Case
for Group Rights
LauraS. Underkuffler

I. Introduction
During the past 20 years, the importance of human
genetic information has exploded. Whether sought
for medical treatment, disease prediction studies, cultural studies, or the general study of human origins,
human genetic information is now viewed as crucial
for scientific research and general attempts at human
understanding.
With the importance of genetic information have
come bitter battles over its control. The demonstrated
power of human genetic information has moved the
issue of its "ownership" from the realm of musty academic musings to protracted political and legal battles
among "source" individuals, researchers, commercial
concerns, government agencies, and others. Whether
collected through targeted scientific studies,' "dis3
2
carded" biological tissue, initial charitable bequest,
or other means, genetic information and the biological
materials in which it is contained have become the subject of protracted legal battles for control and intense
social and ethical controversy.
In these battles, some principles have emerged that
are beyond dispute. Most fundamentally, the ability of
individuals to control the disposition and genetic testing of their own biological materials is (as a matter of
theory, at least) beyond question. No one would argue
today that an individual could be subject to genetic testing for studies against her will, or that biological samples obtained from individuals under specified conditions could be simply deemed "free" of such conditions
by researchers. Although difficult problems remain in
the interpretation of research agreements, the circumstances under which "informed consent" was given,
and so on, the general principle that individuals have a
right to control the genetic testing of their own biological materials is assumed by ethicists, medical researchers, and others. It is also assumed (through contract,
property, and privacy theories) by law.
Far more contested is the idea of group control over
the collection, testing, and disposition of the biological materials of its members. When, for instance, isolated indigenous populations are chosen for genetic
study in an effort to "grasp.. .human origins, evolution,
prehistory, and potential,"4 or patented cell lines are
made from blood samples collected from indigenous
peoples, 5 affected groups have demanded control of
such projects citing an invasion of sovereignty, lack
of informed consent, and moral grounds. 6 Group
demands for effective control or "veto power" have,
however, been met with skepticism or outright rejecLaura S. Underkuffler, J.D., is the Arthur Larson DistinguishedProfessorat Duke UniversityLaw School.
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of unexamined bias than considered reasons for the
tion by many researchers, ethicists, and legal scholrejection of this right.
ars. 7 The stated reasons for this response are multifarious, and include representational conundrums
II. Groups as Rights-Holders: General
(who is "the group"?),8 practical problems (how do
Arguments
we handle "dispersed communities"?),9 ethical ques1
Contemporary Western jurisprudence is replete with
tions,1° and resource issues., In addition, when the
broad, philosophical statements that identify individdemanding groups are indigenous peoples, acknowl1
ual rights as the appropriate foundation for protection
edging group rights implicates larger debates and
of human rights and liberties. Rooted in natural rightsf
demands of indigenous peoples for rights to govertheories, social compact theories, Kantian notions ol
nance, territorial integrity, cultural autonomy, and
the individual, and other philosophical antecedents,
other incidents of self-determination. 12
it is generally assumed by liberal democratic governIn this essay, I wish to focus on an underlying theoments that legally cognizable human rights are indiretical issue which I believe seriously affects our colvidual rights, which stand against the potential tyrlective response to the idea of group rights in the
anny of government. 14 Group rights, collective rights,
genetic-control context. That issue is: to what extent
1
or societal rights are simply ignored in the American
are our responses to claims of group rights hampered
Constitution, the United Nations Charter, and other
by our bringing to the table (consciously or unconsciously) a model which is structured
to acknowledge only individual conThe idea that Western jurisprudence shuns group
cerns? Put another way, to what extent
rights is, itself, an obvious conceptual fallacy. In
are our objections to group rights in
i
this context a product of our inabilinternational law, governments - which recognize
ity (or refusal) to imagine the idea of
and enforce individual rights - are themselves
group rights, rather than the product
legal status.
groups with recognized
of truly substantive concerns?
1•
recognized
nis underlying issue or conceptualization is manifest in the responses
watershed documents as a protected source or expresof many commentators to the idea of group geneticsion of human rights as either a philosophical or opercontrol rights. Consider, for instance, the following
5
ative matter.'
observation by Eric Juengst, a leading commentator in
In the day-to-day workings of American jurispruthe field. "[Some] argue," he writes, "that groups, once
dence, expressed fidelity to this principle is strong.
targeted for ...study, should be given the opportunity
Individual rights are assumed, for both positive and
to decline participation on behalf of their members by
negative reasons,' 6 to be the building blocks for legal
being asked in advance for permission to contact and
rights and legal responsibilities. Legal interests,
recruit individuals from their membership...' "These
whether asserted in tort, contract, constitutional law,
proposals have vast practical and ethical implicaor otherwise, are immediately and reflexively envitions. If groups have interests that require protections
sioned in individual terms. Whether we are speaking
like those of individual subjects, a layer of research
of private wrongs or wrongs by government, it is genarrangements would be necessary that our individuerally assumed in American jurisprudence that it is the
ally-oriented biomedical research ethic is ill-prepared
individual who is the focus of concern. Group rights,
to define or delimit "'
which are experienced and exercised with others, are
Juengst may well be right that there are significant
generally ignored as a jurisprudential category. 8
psychological barriers to the idea of group geneticUpon deeper reflection, of course, this assumed anticontrol rights. However, in this essay I argue that the
group bias in Western jurisprudence is fraught with
notion that group control of genetic testing and use
theoretical and practical weaknesses. For instance,
is incompatible with contemporary notions of legal
whether groups ("collectivities") can possess moral
rights is greatly exaggerated. Group control is, in fact,
rights has been the subject of extensive scholarly coma natural implementation of many existing legal theomentary. If one begins with the proposition that all
ries and is viewed in many contexts as an enforceable
moral value is rooted in the well-being of individual
legal right. Although there may be valid objections to
human beings, then the idea that moral rights "can
particular instances of group control of genetic testinhere in collectivities as such" is obviously untening and use, there is no generally valid objection,
able.' 9 If, on the other hand, one accepts the moral
as a matter of theory, to the implementation of this
value of distinctly collective interests, the idea of morright. Wholesale objections are, thus, more a product
384
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ally grounded group rights follows.20 Group rights,
in this view, are intended to protect distinctly collective interests, such as larger societal recognition and
respect for the group's decision-making mechanisms,
2
rights, and powers. 1
From the point of view of what rights do, there is no
structural reason why legal rights - which guarantee
particular states of affairs in law - cannot be afforded to
groups as well as to individuals.22 Indeed, the idea that
Western jurisprudence shuns group rights is, itself, an
obvious conceptual fallacy. In international law, governments - which recognize and enforce individual
rights - are themselves groups with recognized legal
status. In addition, groups of all kinds are recognized
in a myriad of circumstances. Binding international
agreements and non-binding international declarations recognize group rights in the contexts of cultural
6
property, 23 education, 24 religion,25 and genocide2
27
National, ethnic, religious, and linguistic minorities,
as well as indigenous peoples,28 are afforded group
rights.29
Within the United States, we routinely recognize
the distinct interests and decision-making power
of groups in law. Lesser political and governmental
entities, such as states, counties, and municipal governments, enjoy unquestioned legal status. Since the
time of the country's founding, the Supreme Court
and Congress have recognized Indian tribes as quasisovereign nations.3 ° Other non-governmental groups
that have enjoyed legal or de facto recognition of their
interests and powers include for-profit and charitable
corporations, unincorporated associations, partnerships, families, labor unions, racial minorities,3' and
religious groups. 32 Commitments to freedom of association, freedom of contract, the institution of marriage, and other Western legal commitments involve
- explicitly or implicitly - the recognition of legally
33
binding, group-based rights.
It is true that the group rights asserted in these
examples are quite varied in nature. In some cases,
groups exercise decision-making powers as groups,
using their own designated processes (for example,
corporations, local governments, religious groups, and
Indian tribes). In other cases, "group" status confers
far less (for instance, the simple acknowledgment of
perceived group needs in affirmative action efforts and
laws protecting cultural property).34 The form of group
recognition may have important consequences for the
idea of group rights in any particular context, as discussed below. At this point, it is important to appreciate only that recognition of group interests, whether
based upon territory, culture, ethnicity, or other
grounds, is a routine legal matter, and that the denial
of rights based upon these interests requires more
GENETICS AND GROUP RIGHTS * FALL

than the simple assertion that group rights are alien
to our law. As Thomas Pogge has stated, "the question therefore cannot be whether we should depart
from our ordinary practice of recognizing only.. .rights
of individuals....There is no such ordinary practice.
Group rights.. .are staples of standard Western liberal

thought."35

The question remains whether group rights should
be recognized in the context of genetic-information
control. It is to that question that we now turn.
III. Groups as Rights-Holders: Genetic
Testing and Use
There are many reasons why identifiable groups whose
members are the "source" for genetic-testing programs may wish to assert demands for control. Groups
may wish to ensure that they (or their members) reap
the health benefits or commercial earnings that their
genetic information yields. They may wish to oppose
the idea of genetic testing or commercial exploitation
of that testing on cultural or ethical grounds. They
may wish to avoid collective risks that these projects
present to members of a genetically identifiable group.
If particular diseases or disabilities are associated
with particular genetic variations, and those variations are (in turn) associated with particular groups,
then there is a real risk of group discrimination and
36
stigmatization.
Whatever the reasons for its assertion, the idea of
group control or "veto power" over genetic testing
and its uses has been vigorously opposed on various
grounds. Some of the reasons for opposition, such
as resource questions, are general restraints on any
research project design. Other reasons for opposition
challenge the essential premise of group rights and
group control. It is the validity of the latter that we will
examine here.
A. What is a "Group?"
1. STRUCTURAL CHALLENGES

As an abstract matter, the idea of a socially or legally
cognizable "group" is very broad and generally refers
to persons who share certain common characteristics
or interests. 37 These characteristics or interests may be
chosen by the individuals involved (e.g., geographical
residence, cultural adoption, self-identified racial or
religious membership) or they may be involuntarily
conferred (e.g., country of birth, biological race, or
tribal, religious, or other membership by parentage).
The fluidity and complexities of group definition
have made it an essentially contested concept. 3 Theorists have advanced varying formulae for group recognition in particular contexts. For instance, Thomas
Pogge argues that an "ethnic group" must meet three
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conditions: the members of the set must understand
themselves as descendants of members of a historical
society (in a broad sense, including tribes, principalities, and others); they must share a common culture,
or partial culture, which they take to be connected,
through a continuous history; and the group must
contain all, or nearly all, of the persons who, within the
relevant state, are taken to share the group's descent
and culture. 39 Natan Lerner, in an analysis of group
recognition in international law, stresses the purposes
and goals of asserted groups, 40 the relationship of
the group to other groups, 41 the permanence of the
43
group,4 2 the naturalness or spontaneity of the group,
and whether group membership is voluntary or involuntary in nature. 44 Still other theorists emphasize
shared normative understandings, 45 the importance of
the group to personal identity,46 and whether the wellbeing of group members is at least in part determined
by group well-being7
All of these criteria involve acknowledged vagueness; for instance, most definitions require only that
the group in question have some (unspecified) numto qualify for recognized
ber of these characteristics
"group" status.4 8 In addition, there is no specification,
in these lists, as to how broad or narrow the required
commonalities must be, or - in the case of shared history or culture - how long these commonalities must
exist in time. 49 As Pogge puts it, "[hlow important is it
for qualifying as a Navajo, for example, what fraction
of one's ancestry is Navajo, whether one checks off
the 'Native American' category on affirmative action
questionnaires, how much one knows about Navajo
history, culture, and affairs, [or] how one is regarded
by other Navajos...?"50 Groups, whether identified by

any cluster of the assembled characteristics, often lack
"clear identity" or the presence of reasonably clear
boundaries for determining membership, responsibilities, benefits, and authoritative voice in the group's
51
affairs.
In addition, for groups to be recognized social, political, or legal actors, they must have "effective agency,"
or the ability "to form goals, deliberate, choose, intend,
act, and carry out evaluations of actions taken."52 If,
for instance, a group's consent for genetic testing is
required, there must be some kind of effective mechanism for ascertaining the group's stand on the matter
and some effective leadership or other structure with
whom those seeking permission for the project can
deal.
Finally, there is the problem of "nesting,' on both
an individual and group level. On the individual level,
general criteria for "group" status - even if established
with great specificity - may result in multiple and possibly conflicting group memberships for individuals.

For instance, a single individual may (by birth) be
a member of particular geographical, religious, and
racial groups, and may (by choice) be a member of
groups based upon residence, self-identified ethnicity, chosen religious identity, and other factors. On
the group level, "nesting" will occur when smaller
groups are (by definition) part of larger, more inclusive groups. For instance, as Richard Sharp and Morris Foster describe, an individual Mohawk community,
if located on a reservation with other Mohawk communities, may be part of a larger, politically defined
community. That larger reservation-based community
may consider itself part of a common Mohawk national
community. And the Mohawk nation is, itself, a part of
the League of Iroquois and may be represented, as a
political matter, by the National Congress of American
Indians. 53 On either level, the nesting problem means
that individuals and groups may be subject to conflicting identities and conflicting interests.
The critical question for our inquiry is whether any
of these structural issues involving group identity and
function are fatal to the recognition of group geneticcontrol claims. It is beyond question that certain
issues will complicate the idea of using group rights to
control genetic testing and use of genetic information,
such as that group recognition may be uncertain or
arbitrary, that questions of agency may exist, and that
individuals and groups may be subject to conflicting
group loyalties. However, are these problems fatal to
the implementation of this goal?
There may be certain proposed "groups" - for
instance, Irish Americans, or Ashkenazi Jewish
women - whose numbers are so large, and whose
sense of group cohesion and group decision-making
are so weak, that the idea of group rights in the genetic
control context is unworkable. By and large, however,
it is not these groups who are making genetic-control
claims. Rather, it is groups who generally meet some or
all of the recognition criteria set forth above, and who
have - by virtue of their assertion of the claim - some

kind of authoritative voice or structure with whom to
deal. The question is, what of these groups?
In considering this question, we must return to the
observations about group status in international and
domestic law with which we began. Despite the rhetorical primacy of the individual in Western jurisprudence, group interests, relations, and decision-making
structures are recognized throughout international
and domestic law. Local, state, and national political
entities, religious groups, cultural groups, corporate
groups, minority groups, indigenous and tribal groups,
and a myriad of others have distinctly recognized and
protected interests in law despite the definitional
uncertainties, agency issues, and nesting problems
JOURNAL OF LAW, MEDICINE & ETHICS
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that surround them.54 We simply accept such problems as part of the analytical terrain; we accept, for
instance, that sorting out the conflicting (group) interests surrounding "cultural property" is as manageable
as sorting out the conflicting (individual and group)
interests surrounding "due process of law." Structural
issues of these kinds are not unique to group geneticcontrol claims; they are involved in the recognition
of all group entities and interests by law. Indeed, in a
broader sense, problems of definitional uncertainties,
agency issues, and overlapping or conflicting authority
are not limited to legal treatment of groups; they are
an endemic partof any attempt to organize any human
activity in terms of legal rights and powers.
Attempting to honor group claims in the field of
genetic research would be undoubtedly more cumbersome, time consuming, and perhaps preclusive (of
our ends), should groups refuse particular research
proposals, collection methodologies, patents, or uses.
However, these are costs imposed by group control,
not structural or analytical impossibilities. Just as we
tolerate and accommodate the societal costs involved
in honoring group claims (and other claims) in other
contexts, we can - if we wish - tolerate and accommodate the societal costs involved in this context as well.
2. SUBSTANTIVE CHALLENGES

Critics have also raised substantive challenges to the
ability of particular groups to assert genetic-control
claims. In particular, critics challenge the moral capacity or qualifications of groups to control the genetic
decision-making of their members.
In the genetic-control context, "groups" can be identified in two different ways. First, one might identify
genetic populations, or "demes," which are comprised
of individuals who share relevant genetic information.
In addition, there are as self-identified or other-identified social groups or "ethnoi;' whose members are the
subject of genetics testing and use.
Objections to group control by demes, or genetic
populations, are well summarized by Eric Juengst. If,
he writes, by "groups" "we mean genetic populations,
or human 'demes,' we are not talking about the kind
of human groups that can be approached for permission: they have no moral standing, deserve none, and
in any case are unidentifiable until the research has
been conducted."55
To examine this argument, let us begin with the
question of group pre-researchcontrol. If a particular
genetic population cannot be identified (as a scientific or social matter) before the research is conducted,
then denial of pre-research control to such groups is
obviously justified. A group that cannot be identified,
by its "members" or by others, cannot assert a common

interest of any of the kinds that we have identified in
this context. The group qua group will have no group
cultural, ethical, or other grounds on which to oppose
the project, or group interests in the project's benefits
or profits.
Let us consider, however, a different case: one where
the genetic population in question is certain, or very
likely, identifiable before the research is done. In a
recent article, Graeme Laurie discusses the interests
of family members in shared familial genetic information.56 He observes that traditionally, when we have
asked where the control of information should lie,
the answer has been "the source."57However, "[in the
genetic sphere, such an answer is simplistic and unsatisfactory. 58 He writes:
[Glenetic information differs from other forms of
medical information because it pertains to a range
of people and not solely to one individual. In this
respect, it gives rise to special problems concerning
how the information should be gathered, stored,
accessed, and used.... [O]ne cannot ignore the fact
that genetic information derived from the sample
also reveals information about the relatives of the
sample source. These persons can base a claim to
the information on precisely the same grounds as
the source, namely: "I have a claim because it is
59
about me."
Indeed, "genetic test results can offer a high degree of
specificity, both in terms of predicting the likelihood
of disease in other family members and in terms of
putting flesh on the bones of a suspicion that has heretofore been unconfirmed" 60 Specific information can
confer "a degree of 'certainty' about future ill health
6
or even the mode and manner of one's own death." '
This information may alter one's self-perception and
create anxiety, depression, and a sense of stigmatization among all of those who believe themselves to be
so identified. 62 Family members may also be the victims of discrimination by third parties, who act on the
prejudices and predictions that this information may
63
arouse.
The example of family consanguinity illustrates that
it is possible for pre-testing, probable-genetic-similarity alone to identify a group with legitimate and legally
cognizable genetic-control interests. 64 The frequency
of such groups beyond the family context is a matter
of question. Evidence to date indicates that almost all
human social groups exhibit wide genetic variation;
only human populations that have been physically isolated for a substantial period show an increase in general genetic homogeneity. The infrequency of genetically identified groups does not mean, however, that
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we should dismiss this as a possible category for group
rights. Where a genetically identified group is present,
and is the subject of genetic study, we should not be
free to ignore its interests.
Let us assume, then, that the problem of identifiability has been met, either because the genetic group
is identifiable (with reasonable certainty) before the
research commences, or because the research itself has
identified the genetic group, and the question is postresearch control. The objections that Juengst summarizes do not end at this point. Rather, they argue that
the idea of "rights" for human demes is still nonsen-

The most obvious objection to the demands of these
groups is that they are unacceptable "surrogates for
demes"7° - that is, that their members lack sufficient
genetic similarity to give them standing to assert
genetic-control claims. For instance, if the dangers
from the project lie in the potential stigmatization or
discriminatory treatment of persons who are found to
carry a particular genetic variation, these dangers (and
the moral rights they create) apply only to those who
share or very likely share the characteristics in question. If the members of a particular cultural, historical, racial, or other group in fact lack genetic similar-

The infrequency of genetically identified groups does not mean, however, that
we should dismiss this as a possible category for group rights. Where
a genetically identified group is present, and is the subject of genetic study,
we should not be free to ignore its interests.
sical, because such groups "have no moral standing,
deserve none," and, in any event, have no capacity to
65
exercise the rights that they might seek.
These arguments are curious. Why would a group,
whose members are bound by genetic similarity, necessarily fail (and deserve to fail) the test of moral or
practical standing? One can imagine how a group
whose members are linked by the presence of a single,
identified gene - for instance, the presence of BRCA1
in Ashkenazi Jewish women 66 - might be too large,
and the shared commonality too small, to forge any
true group interest or identity. However, this failure
occurs not because this is a genetic group per se, but
because it fails to meet the criteria for "groupness," in
the sense of common interests or other criteria that we
67
have (on some other basis) previously established.
There is no a priorireason why genetic groups should
be deemed, in every case, to fail to meet whatever structural requirements we set for group recognition in this
context. Indeed, it is perfectly imaginable that a group,
whose members are bound by genetic ties, would have
strong common interests and practical goals - not the
least of which is the avoidance of group discrimination
and stigmatization.
Let us move now to groups of the second kind: selfidentified or other-identified social groups or "ethnoi,"
whose group identities are rooted in culture, language,
6
race, territorial occupation, or other characteristics. 8
It is these groups (for instance, indigenous peoples,
and geographically or culturally isolated peoples) who
are the most common subjects of genetic research, and
who have been the most forceful in asserting genetic69
control claims.

ity, there is (under this argument) no reason to afford
genetic-control rights to this group.
The answer to this argument inheres in the question that it poses. If we are, in fact, looking for "surrogates for demes" - in a demonstrable, verified, scientific sense - then no social group will surely achieve
this status. Groups whose membership and authority
are based upon culture, history, ethnicity, territorial
proximity, or other factors will at best have possible
genetic similarities - nothing that makes them, with
any assurance, "surrogates for demes."
The "demic certainty" that this objection requires
is not, however, what genetic research of this kind has
assumed. For instance, as Juengst has observed, "it is
the history, migration, and relative disease burdens
of humanity's many socially defined groups, not our
anonymous demes, that derives most descriptions and
defenses of population-genomics research."7' Indeed,
it seems quite inexplicable to the members of these
groups why - if their group status makes them targets for genetic research - that group status is, in turn,
insufficient to allow their assertion of genetic-control
claims. For instance, if "group status" confers sufficient commonality for targeted genetic research, then
presumably it also confers sufficient commonality for
the risk of stigmatization or discrimination.72
The demand for "demic certainty" is also flawed, in
that it narrows too profoundly the range of interests
that groups, in this context, can legitimately assert. If
we require "demic certainty," we implicitly assume that
it is genetic similarity alone that generates cognizable
group interests. In fact, the claims of groups, particularly indigenous, tribal, and territorially isolated
JOURNAL OF LAW, MEDICINE & ETHICS
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groups, go far beyond those interests. These groups
claim a violation of culture. They claim a disregard of
ethics, 73 and commercial exploitation.74 They claim a
loss of autonomy, territorial integrity, and governmental respect. 75 As explained by Aroha Te Pareake Mead:
[For the Maori and others,] genes and combinations
of genes are not the sole property of individuals.
They are part of the heritage of families, communities, clans, tribes, and entire indigenous nations....
[As a result,] [t]he HGDP [Human Genome Diversity Project] is viewed by many indigenous peoples as
offensive, frivolous, and disrespectful of the integrity
of nature, life, the ancestors - all that is sacred....
As outsiders, who will the HGDP approach? Who
will they consider to have the definitive vote?.. .Can
consent be reduced to an individual level when the
very nature of genetic research implicates a wider
76
group?
Just as cultural, ethical, and governmental concerns
are deemed by the majority culture to be valid and vital
interests that justify the power of local and national
governments, so those concerns must be recognized as
valid and vital interests of other "social" groups who are
the targets of genetic research and who respond with
the assertion of genetic-control claims. The sufficiency
of group interests in any setting to establish group
rights is, of course, a deep and complicated inquiry.
However, we cannot - on the grounds of "moral capacity" or "standing" - simply choose to disregard, as a
class, the rights of social groups or "ethnoi" to assert
genetic-control claims.
Finally, the ability of social or cultural groups to control the genetic decision-making of their members is
implicitly challenged by what might be called the "critique of cultural orthodoxy."77 Scholars have observed
that culture is "a process, or dialogue, through which
individuals continually renegotiate the world and their
place in it."78 Cultural identity is continually evolving, as a result of both internal dissent and outside
challenges. Madhavi Sunder argues that the role of
cultural dissent is both powerful and unavoidable; it
"enhances individual autonomy and equality within
culture, enables cultural 'outsiders' to challenge discrimination without fear of losing their culture, challenges cultural relativist arguments, prevents insularity, improves relations across cultural groups, and
increases diversity."79
When "cultural survival" is ensconced as a legal
norm, there is a tendency to deny the fluid and contested nature of culture and, instead, to see culture "as
GENETICS AND GROUP RIGHTS * FALL

a thing that is possessed,or owned, by a largely homogenous and discrete, or bounded, group."80 In particular,
legal recognition of the "preservation of culture" tends
to "do more than offer a means for cultural communities to regain a degree of control over their community
and expressions."' Legally enforced cultural boundaries may work to enforce cultural orthodoxy and to reinforce the power of cultural leaders or spokespersons
who suppress dissent. "'Law in the domains of culture'
threatens to freeze cultural groups in the status quo
and dramatically shift the balance of power between
members and leaders of cultural groups over the creation and control of cultural meanings."2 When the
treatment of human genetic information is at issue,
the risks are apparent. Recognizing "control rights"
by groups, in the name of "cultural preservation," may
simply serve to stifle cultural evolution and dissenting
voices about the profound and potentially contested
cultural, social, and medical issues that human genetics studies involve.
The recognition of the possibilities of repression
of cultural dissent, false leadership, and other issues
within groups that might assert genetic-control claims
is obviously important. However, we must also remember that attempted repression of cultural change and
dissent is not limited to the human groups that might
assert genetic-control claims. All cultures - whether
ethnically, politically, historically, religiously, or otherwise defined - are subject to the same evolutionary
processes and the same desires on the parts of some to
repress those processes. There is as much reason to be
concerned about such risks when evaluating the professed cultural norms and positions of, for instance,
traditional religious groups or local government leaders as there is when evaluating the professed cultural
norms and positions of groups that make genetic-control claims. Intellectual and cultural ferment is simply
a part of the human condition. That fact does not preclude our recognition of the claims of groups in other
settings, and it should not - of itself - preclude the
recognition of the claims of groups in this.
B. Conflict with Individual Choice
Another serious objection to group rights in the
genetic-control context is embedded in the general
bias in Western jurisprudence against group rights
with which we began. To the extent that rights are
conferred upon groups or other collectivities, they
are taken from individuals who are members of those
groups. If we empower tribal governments, insular
religious-group leaders, indigenous-group spokespersons, and others, we may enhance the autonomy of
these groups, but it will be at the expense of the individual autonomy of their members.
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That group exercise of authoritative powers entails
loss of individual autonomy is undeniable. If the
United States Congress decides whether human cloning is permissible, individuals are denied that choice. If
a tribal government decides whether researchers shall
be welcome on a reservation, individuals in that tribe
are denied that choice. That group power is exercised
in derogation of individual autonomy is tautologically
true.
It is equally obvious, however, that we have no problem with governmental authority and group rule in a
myriad of contexts. Philosophical hand-wringing over
the inevitable loss of individual autonomy to group
power is, thus, beside the point. In an organized society, groups will prevail in some circumstances. The
question, thus, is not whether individual autonomy
should, in some idealized sense, be lost - but whether
a particulargroup in a particularcontext should be
afforded this power.
Let us proceed, then, to the genuine question:
whether there are reasons why individual-group conflict in the genetic-control context is particularly troubling. The most potent argument for individual control in this context is respect for the self-determination
of patients. 3 Since the genetics field involves disease
- its detection, prevention, and cure - it is argued that
individuals who are subject to those diseases have
extremely strong moral claims to control in this field.
This is an important argument and must be carefully considered. It is, of course, possible to question
the idea of the individual that this argument assumes.
Even in the disease detection, prevention, and treatment context, the model of the supremacy of individual decision-making may not be shared by the persons
who belong to groups who are asserting genetic-control claims. For individuals who are members of many
societies, perspectives on the nature of disease, the
subject-investigator relationship, and the doctorpatient relationship do not mirror the Western (primarily American) idea of radical individualism.84 For
persons in many cultures, the conflict between individual personhood and group norms in the geneticcontrol context may be far less than this objection
supposes.
However, some conflict between individual desire
for genetically related disease research and group decision-making can be presumed to be inevitable. In these
circumstances, we must seriously ask: should collective determinations be binding upon individuals?
To analyze this question, we must distinguish the
following situations:
Groups whose memberships derive from the voluntary associations of individuals.

" Groups whose powers are governmental in
nature.
" Groups whose powers are not governmental, but
whose memberships are nonetheless involuntary or coerced on biological, practical, or other
grounds.
If the situation involves a group of the first kind - i.e.,
a voluntary association of individuals - the conflict
will most likely resolve itself. Any individual who is
a member of a voluntary group, and who is unhappy
with group decisions about genetic testing, use, or patenting, can simply eschew the group's authority and
seek participation or (non-participation) on terms
and conditions of her own. A member of a cultural
group, a religious group, or other voluntary group who
does not wish to participate in genetic studies, or who
wishes to participate in studies that the group rejects,
is free - on her own - to do so. There may be social or
cultural repercussions from this action; there may be
individual hardships from group schism; there may be
diminished opportunities for participation, if others
decline - but none of these is peculiar to, or preventable by the denial of, the idea of group control.
If the situation involves a group of the second kind
- i.e., a group with the powers of government - we
have the other extreme. In this situation, membership
criteria and the group's authority are established by
law. This being so, the question of where individual
rights end, and collective rights begin, has already
been established. If the United States Congress forbids
embryonic stem cell research - if a tribal government
forbids the reservation testing of its members - then
those are the decisions of sovereignty. The fact that
individual desires for research or treatment may be
thwarted does not negate the collective values and collective rights on which these decisions are based. The
idea that a "collective decision [in genetics studies] is
not binding on individual community members" 8 5 is
therefore true ifmembership in the group is voluntary
or other methods exist for individual exit. It is not true
if the group is sovereign and exercises those sovereign
powers.
It is groups of the third kind that present the most
difficult cases: groups whose powers are not governmental, but whose membership is nonetheless involuntary or coerced on biological, practical, or other
grounds. Examples might include racial or ethnic
groups, genetically linked family members, isolated
populations whose contacts with researchers are controlled by leaders, and so on. In these cases, we have
neither the powers of sovereignty nor the power of exit
to answer the question. Rather, we must do so on other
grounds.
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In my view, resolution of these cases is necessarily
contextual and dependent upon the strength of the
competing interests involved. Of critical importance
on the individual side is the ethic of individual disease detection, prevention, or treatment, or "patient
status," with which our consideration of individualgroup conflict began. If the individual's dissent is due
to immediate and tangible health concerns, it is difficult to imagine any group interest that could trump
it. Thus, for instance, a family-group member has a
right to seek genetic testing despite the desires of other
family members for ignorance. s6 Likewise, an indigenous group member would have a right (in theory,
at least) to seek genetically inspired treatment for disease, despite the objections of her culture.
The balance of interests will shift as the connection between treatment of individual disease and
the genetic project becomes more and more attenuated. Where, for instance, the genetic project is simply genetic sampling for anthropological research, or
for possible discovery of diseases or cures, we cannot
assume that group interests must always yield to individual desires. In each case, the strength of opposing interests must be considered. If the group fears
stigmatization through genetic testing, then the size
of the group, the social identifiability of members of
the group, and the social opprobrium attached to the
genetically identified disease are relevant. There is
much greater danger of stigmatization when the group
is small, its members are readily identifiable, and the
disease is devastating and incurable (e.g., the association of a tribal group with schizophrenia) than there is
when the group encompasses millions of individuals,
who are only generally identifiable, and the disease
is common and curable (e.g., the association of a particular segment of the general population with particular kinds of cancer). Similarly, if the group interest
is cultural in nature, different decisions will be justified if the cultural impact is slight, or if it is a case
of serious cultural challenge, erosion, or substantial
destruction.87
In short, the idea that the intrinsic merit of individual autonomy should preclude the exercise of geneticcontrol powers by groups is overly simplistic. There is
no reflexive, theoretical reason why individual decision-making should be favored in this context. Outcomes must depend upon the nature of group and
individual relations, and the strength of the competing
interests involved.
C. "Common Heritage"Arguments
A final argument against group rights in the geneticcontrol context turns the theory of group rights upon
itself. According to this argument, there is nothing
GENETICS AND GROUP RIGHTS * FALL

wrong with group rights; indeed, utilitarian arguments (the "greatest good for the greatest number"),
which implicitly underlie claims for group rights in
this context, are certainly correct. Rather, the problem
is that the applicable "group" is defined too narrowly.
The "group" to whom rights should be afforded is not
an indigenous group, or a family group, or an ethnic
group; it is all of humankind.
This is a kind of "nesting" argument, but with
broader implications. Groups who assert geneticcontrol claims are obviously part of the larger human
community. If members of those groups have genetic
characteristics that would benefit disease research or
other scientific study, then there is (in the view of these
critics) no reason to confer control on the particular
sub-group involved. Their genetic materials - like all
of the world's resources - should be utilized in a way to
benefit all of humanity. To do less is to fail to recognize
the common interests and needs of all humankind.
"Common heritage" arguments of this kind have
been made in all genetics research projects.88 A
famous example can be found in an early Human
Genome Diversity Project Summary Document,
which described the "main value" of the project as "its
enormous potential for illuminating our understanding of human history and identity." "There is a cultural
imperative for us to.. .use the extraordinary scientific
power that has been created through the development
of DNA technology..for the benefit ofallpeople...."89
This argument seems to advance a very simple challenge to the size of the net which we shall cast. For
instance, in the famous case of Hagahai DNA sampling (and patenting), 90 the question thus seems to
be: who should be our "group of concern," a Hagahai
tribe of 293 members or all of those who will benefit
from treatment of leukemia and degenerative neurological diseases - potentially, all of humankind? 91 Put
this way, as a numbers game, the answer appears to be
obvious.
However, we must think again. The idea that the
interests of the many will always trump the interests
of the few in this field is obviously untrue. Disease
research and cures are undoubtedly critical human
interests, yet they do not allow us to force individuals
to undergo genetic testing, or allow us to conscript
individuals for medical research. There are obviously
limits to the use of a purely "utilitarian" calculus, in
this sense, in the achievement of public health. Moreover, just as we cannot assume the supremacy of the
many over the individual, so we cannot assume the
supremacy of the many over smaller groups.
"Common heritage" arguments are, thus, a way to
(falsely) assume the superiority of numbers. They are
also a way to preclude, in a single stroke, the asser-
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tion of any interests by the opposing, smaller group.
As Laurie Whitt has bitterly noted in a related context,
"[t]he key first step is to declare that these indigenous
genetic resources belong to everyone. As the 'common
heritage of mankind'..., they are 'not owned by any
one people and are quite literally a part of our human
heritage from the past: Thus, they are 'looked upon
as a public good for which no payment is necessary or
appropriate,' and are ready for conversion into private
92
property by those who would exploit them. "Common heritage" arguments are declarations of ownership, control, and exclusivity of interests. There must
be more than a simple, unilateral declaration of appropriation to justify this - as opposed to some other allocation of power.
IV. Conclusion
The idea of group rights is generally regarded with
deep skepticism in contemporary Western jurisprudence. It is generally assumed by liberal democratic
governments and their supporters that moral value is
rooted in the well-being of individuals, and that rights
are a way to enforce this truth.
This general skepticism has pervaded the responses
of many researchers and policymakers to the claims
by groups to control over the collection, testing, and
disposition of the genetic materials of their members.
Because of a jurisprudential and ethical model which
is rooted in individual concerns, the idea of group
rights in this context has an aura of illegitimacy at the
outset. We begin with a model that allows - only with
great effort - the imaginingof rights for groups.
It has been my contention in this essay that objections to group rights in this context are more a product of this model's unexamined bias than considered
reasons. If one accepts the moral value of distinctively
collective interests, then there is no theoretical barrier
to the recognition of morally grounded group rights.
As a practical matter, group rights are cognizable in
law, if lawmakers so desire. Indeed, lawmakers have
so desired, in the recognition of rights of local and
state governments, Indian tribes, families, religious
and ethnic groups, and others. Evaluated analytically,
none of the structural objections to group geneticcontrol rights raised (such as group affiliation, group
agency, or "nesting") nor the substantive objections
(the alleged inappropriateness of "demes" or social
groups as rights-carriers, the unjustified derogation
of individual autonomy that group rights involve, or
the needs of our "common heritage") is as widely preclusive, or as unique to these group claims, as opponents commonly argue. There may be uncertainties
in group genetic-control claims; there may be societal
costs involved in their granting. But those uncertain-

ties and costs are, in truth, no different in kind from
those that we readily decide to tolerate or incur in
other contexts.
Claims by groups to genetic control might be claims
that we decide to honor or not, in view of all of the
circumstances. However, those decisions should be
informed and reasoned ones, and not simply the products of unexamined bias.
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